Archive for the ‘Coaching Chronicles’ Category

Suppositions

Posted: January 29, 2012 in Coaching Chronicles, Memoirs
Tags:

Never trust someone who has all the answers all the time.

One must know the difference between judgement and evaluation.

Actions are a better means of measurement then words.

Judging others will only define you as a person who needs to judge.

Speaking the truth is sometimes difficult.

Motivation does not always come down to being about incentives.

However, incentives matter.

Dealing in absolutes helps in clarity of vision.

Seeking the truth is a calling.

Finding the truth is a journey.

 

 

 

Advertisements

I just watched the last 4 minutes of the 49ers-Saints Divisional playoff game from this last weekend on NFL Network’s NFL Replay.  To say that this was one of the most exciting games I’ve ever been witness to seems like an understatement.  This game had it all: a hard hitting affair with offensive fireworks and a raucous home stadium providing the ultimate backdrop for the unfolding drama on the field.  The redemption of Alex Smith was apparent as he was not to be denied in those last 4 minutes.

Steve Young would say that Alex Smith finally grabbed that “over [his] dead body” quality.  According to Young, this is when a great quarterback takes a stand and says, “it’s going down a certain way and you’re going to have to kill me if it doesn’t go down my way.”  That’s what I saw at the end of the game on Saturday, and throughout, as well.  Even though there were moments when many 49er fans could have thought, “here we go again,” Smith maintained his composure and kept making the plays when he needed to.

In his last drive, starting with 1:32 on the clock and only one timeout left, just after Drew Brees and Jimmy Graham had delivered a dagger of a score – an impressive 66 yard pass and run to re-take the lead, 32-29 – Smith lead the 49ers on a 7 play 85 yard drive, capped off by a game winning strike to Vernon Davis, leaving only 9 seconds on the clock. Smith calmly got his team lined up at the line of scrimmage and commanded the offense without panic.  He was calculated and patient in the way that he dropped the ball off to Gore as the Saints dropped into deep coverage, inviting Saints defensive coordinator Gregg Williams to bring pressure, as he had done so routinely all game long.  Then, Smith saw his opening and did not flinch when he found Davis running away from single coverage, setting the scene for the dramatic victory.

The way this game ended for 49er fans brought to life an Oliver Stone-like image of the rise of ghost’s of 49ers past: Joe Montana, Dwight Clark and “The Catch”; Steve Young, Terrell Owens and “The Catch II”; a maligned 49ers quarterback getting the “monkey off [his] back,” a la Steve Young after the 1994 season’s Super Bowl; the 1981 49ers coming out of nowhere – with a 13-3 record, a genius-in-the-making head coach, and an NFL 2nd ranked defense to boot … all swelling up into one moment of history invoking action, attacking our sensibilities as to where the 49ers have been and what they are to become once again – a 10 year siege of ineptitude, failure and frustration wiped away with awe inspiring execution – bringing back shades of a dominant era and one of football’s original dynasties.

49ers head coach, Jim Harbaugh, said of the final offensive play, “I know there was ‘The Catch’ … I don’t know what you’re going to call this one … ‘The throw? The throw and catch?'”

Here is what Harbaugh’s “Throw and Catch” breaks down to on paper – notice the tight windows Smith had to get the ball through in order to give Davis a chance:

In typical Harbaugh fashion, the head coach was quick to praise multiple players when prompted about the game winning effort – reemphasizing this year’s 49er doctrine that it is always about the team, the team, the team.

“These guys are my heroes.  All of them.  Alex was heroic in this game.  So was Justin, so was Donte, so was Aldon, so was Vernon Davis.  You take your play to the heroic.  That’s what he did.  That’s what all our guys did.  Just the way they all fight.  It’s a wicked, competitive fight that’s in our guys,” said the steely coach as he reflected on what was, what has been and what will be as the 49ers push on in their run to grab the organizations sixth Lombardi Trophy.

Yesterday was the 30th anniversary of one of the most famous plays in 49er history.  I submit to you the diagram (from the appendix of Bill Walsh’s book, Building a Champion) of the play Walsh, Joe Montana and Dwight Clark made famous – simply known as “The Catch”:

On the play (Brown Left Slot – Sprint Right Option), Montana’s first option was to sprint-out and hit Freddie Solomon (#88) in the front corner of the end zone.  Fullback Earl Cooper (#49) and halfback Lenvil Elliott (#35) set the edge for Montana as he started his sprint-out to the right.  The offensive line reached on the front-side and hinged on the back-side.  The Dallas Cowboys were playing tight man to man coverage.  When Solomon was covered, Montana drifted away from the pursuing defensive linemen, allowing Clark time to change direction and lose his man, Everson Walls (#24).  He pumped once as he processed his options (1-flat, 2-over, 3-run) and a second time to get the taller defensive linemen to jump, providing a clear path to get rid of the ball.  Finally, he lofted a pass into the corner of the end zone where only Clark (#87) could reach it.  And the rest, as they say, is history.

Dwight Clark makes a leaping catch to send the 49ers into the Super Bowl

Enjoy the following short clip of a young Chris Berman and his live coverage of the play that started it all:

The 49ers hit Red Zone pay-dirt on Monday Night Football by running the ball in with Frank Gore for their second touchdown of the evening.  The play that they employed from the Steelers’ 5 yard line on 2nd and goal was “F-Counter”.

This play differs from the traditional GT-Counter where the backside Guard and Tackle pull, kick-out and lead – as it features traditional Power-O blocking assignments for the offensive front.  If you’ve watched the 49ers much this year (or Jim Harbaugh’s offense at Stanford) you know that they like to run Power-O.  The advantage of running F-Counter, as opposed to GT-Counter, is two-fold: 1) everyone else on the offense essentially blocks their bread-and-butter play – Power-O and 2) it is a quicker hitting misdirection play then traditional GT-Counter.

Notice the differences in basic assignments for the three run plays:

As you can see, there are a few more moving parts to the GT-Counter scheme.  Not only do both the back-side Guard and Tackle have to pull, but the Fullback must cutoff any penetration coming off of the pullers’ departure.  This adds for a nice element of misdirection, however, it is a difficult scheme to perfect if it is not part of your core philosophy, a-la Joe Gibbs and the Counter Trey.

By simply switching assignments on their go-to play – the Power-O – between the back-side Guard and Fullback, the 49ers get a quicker hitting misdirection play that is relatively cheap for them to practice.

I have also heard Coach Harbaugh refer to this as their “wrap” play, after they used the same scheme for a 17 yard TD run to extend their lead in the 4th quarter, in a hard fought battle, against the New York Giants.

In the 49ers offense, “wrap” may very well be a term that they tag onto their basic Power-O play.  For instance, they may call their base play with a number, i.e. 16-Power.  To run the misdirection play with similar Power-O blocking, they can simply replace power with wrap, i.e. 16-Wrap.  The number tells everyone else that they are blocking 16 (Power) and the “wrap” tells the Fullback and back-side Guard to switch responsibilities.

To view Gore’s 5 yard TD run against the Steelers, click here.

Below is what the 49ers offensive front saw before the snap on Gore’s score.  The Steelers defensive front called for Left Tackle, Adam Snyder, and Left Guard, Mike Iupati, to double team the defensive lineman lined up over Iupati.  Snyder’s job is to drive the defensive lineman down the line as Iupati works through him vertically, ready to come off and block the back-side inside linebacker.  Center, Jonathan Goodwin blocks back on the defensive nose tackle and Right Guard, Alex Boone, pulls with a tight path, looking to kick out the first man showing up off of Staley’s down block.  Fullback, Bruce Miller, delays to allow Boone and quarterback, Alex Smith, to clear before he comes back across the formation and leads through to block the front-side inside linebacker.  Anthony Davis and Vernon Davis cutoff any penetration from the back-side.

This is what the pre-snap assignments look like:

If you watch the play closely, you will notice that neither Iupati nor Miller get to their initial blocking assignment.  In fact, right before the snap the play-side inside linebacker blitzed the (A) gap to Iupati’s right.

Often, with younger offensive linemen, this is problematic to the double team.  If the inside man on the double team fails to anticipate an A-gap stunt or blitz, and stays on his double team, the play will undoubtedly be blown up in the backfield.

However, through film study and practice repetition, Iupati knew to have his eyes up and to be alert for “front-side run through”.  He was able to easily ignore the double team and execute a down block on the blitzing linebacker.  Snyder and Iupati were most likely very aware of this possibility (based on the above factors) and probably had some kind of communication in place to inform Snyder that he would have to secure the down block on Iupati’s man without help from Iupati.

Fullback, Bruce Miller, may have had a call echoed to him by the offensive line to alert him to the switch.  It is more likely, however, that he executed his block based on visual cues and stimulus response conditioning.  That is: he was ready for either scenario – like Iupati and Snyder – after numerous repetitions on the practice field (along with film study) working on turning up and blocking the first wrong color from the inside-out.

Notice the assignment change for Iupati and Miller as they recognize front-side run through:

Seeing how this play has paid dividends more then a couple times (click here to view Kendall Hunter’s run against the Giants), I would look for it again when the 49ers get into the red zone … or more so when teams are selling out at the point of attack to stop their bread-and-butter play, the Power-O.

Ezra Shaw/Getty Images

Recently, I came across a scathing article by Jeff Pearlman, a columnist for SI.com, in a feature he did for Esquire.  If you are an Alex Smith “hater”, you will revel in it’s repugnant nature.   However, if you are anything like me, you are excited about the efforts of this year’s squad, and in particular, the back story concerning how much hardship Smith has undergone in order to reach the level of play he has attained today.

There is so much that goes into putting together a winning team, let alone a successful offense that doesn’t detract from your efforts to win games by turning the ball over or squandering scoring opportunities.  It just seems that, with the evolution of fantasy football, the 400 yard, 3 touchdown performance is the only thing that people value anymore.

Here are a few jabs from the author.  First, in regards to Smith’s transformation this season:

In the best season of his seven-year career, the 49ers quarterback has been repeatedly — and enthusiastically — praised as “smart,” “adaptive,” “instinctive,” and “an excellent game manager.” All of which are ear-friendly descriptions, and all of which mean the exact same thing: For a crap player, this guy hasn’t fully embarrassed himself. In other words, that Alex Smith kid really can’t throw or run, but the Niners sure have found ways around it!

Then on to his performance on Monday Night Football against the Pittsburgh Steelers:

Smith delivered what Smith has all season, a series of dinks, dunks, and dils (a word I just invented — Definition: to throw a ball in the manner of former Vikings quarterback Steve Dils). Blessed with Davis, as well as receivers Michael Crabtree and Ted Ginn and the otherworldly running of Frank Gore (as well as a coveted position in the NFC West, the most dreadful division in the recent history of organized sports), Smith doesn’t have to accomplish much to win. And that’s important, because he’s incapable of accomplishing much.

Save another time – my argument against the fallacious reasoning supported by arguments (like this one) that the NFC West is some downtrodden version of what everyone believes is true competition.  Finally, he trivializes Smith’s role as a player who simply does what is asked of him:

Though a nation’s longing eyes turn toward Tebow, they should be focused upon Smith, an average man doing average things for an excellent team. When Coach Jim Harbaugh tells Smith to roll out and throw a three-yard screen to Gore, he does so. When Harbaugh tells Smith to hit Crabtree five yards out on a slant, he does so, too. The whole thing is uncomplicated and precisely scripted, the updated version of NFL Quarterbacking for Dummies.

You can read the entire article here.

Really, Pearlman?

That final line … “The whole thing is uncomplicated and precisely scripted, the updated version of NFL Quarterbacking for Dummies” … it really doesn’t sit well with me.  It’s like he is holding in contempt the whole idea of quarterbacking and team oriented football that we, as 49ers fans, have been trying to get back to for years.

I prefer to look to someone a bit more knowledgeable on the subject than Pearlman for inspiration.  In fact, I’ll go straight to the God Father of modern offensive football, and the architect of this once proud 49ers franchise – Bill Walsh – to decide if Smith and the 49ers apparently should be doing more than what the coaches ask them to do.

In his book, Finding the Winning Edge, Coach Walsh described how the impetus for the West Coast Offense came about when he was a coach with the Cincinnati Bengals:

“We decided that our best chance to win football games was to somehow control the ball. As a result, we devised a ball-control passing game in hopes that if we could make 25 first downs in a given game and if we also had good special teams play, we would have a reasonable chance to stay competitive in the ball game, In the process, hopefully something good would happen”

Hmm? … sounds like a game manager is exactly what this system calls for … and this sure sounds like the blueprint for Jim Harbaugh’s overall philosophy this year.

I remember when Joe Montana was labeled as a “system quarterback” who was only able to flourish due to the dink and dunk style, which ultimately led to the “finesse” label.

Who knows what Joe would have been without Walsh and his “system”?

4 Super Bowl Championships say that it doesn’t matter.

The strides that the 49ers offense makes this year to next will speak volumes about whether or not Smith will become the next “system quarterback” to flourish in the West Coast Offense.

For now, I think the only thing that will quell some of the intense criticism of a man that simply, “does what is asked of him”, is a trip to, and victory in Super Bowl XLVI.

And that is what I am rooting for…

After all, the “West Coast Offense amounts to nothing more than a total attention to detail and an appreciation for every facet of offensive football and refinement of those things that are needed to provide an environment that allows people to perform at their maximum levels of self-actualization” (Walsh ’98).

I don’t know, but it seems that most of these players (this TEAM) have encountered that environment that Walsh describes – here and now – with Harbaugh and this staff (who will throw all the credit back to the players).

I would say that many players are realizing their full potential and I am excited to see more as the season unfolds.  And, I hope to see more players doing simply what is asked of them.

Before last night’s 49ers/Steelers game I explained that I thought the 49ers would feature the  shallow crossing concept to create winning match-ups in efforts to get the ball to their play-makers: Vernon Davis, Michael Crabtree and Kyle Williams. As I stated before, the play concept is great because of its versatility against man and zone coverages (the previous post breaks down the play in a zone blitz situation against the Cardinals).

Well, midway through the third quarter, leading only 6-3, the 49ers need a big play to spark some momentum.  With a first and ten from their own 21 yard line they dialed up the shallow cross concept and gained 31 yards on a nicely thrown ball from Alex Smith to Davis.  This time, however, Smith passed up his initial target on the shallow crossing route, Crabtree, and hit the big gainer to Davis on the deeper crossing route.

Notice the tight window that Smith had to put the ball into due to the trailing defender and safety, Troy Polamalu, closing in over the top:

Here is the NFL video of the play:

QB-Smith-to-TE-Davis-31-yd-pass

Two things to note here, based on my previous analysis of the 49ers’ use of the concept: First, the play against the Cardinals was run against a zone blitzing defensive scheme; this play is run against a man blitzing defensive scheme. Second, I had stated that against man to man coverage that the deeper crossing WR’s assignment would be to break off his route short and look to pick or rub the shallow crosser’s defender from the other side.  As you can see from the diagram and film clip, this was not the case.

Coaching points:

1) Davis recognized the man coverage and adjusted by breaking his route deeper, toward the far sideline.  He did this because he was able to exploit a mismatch and beat the linebacker over the top.  The defender played the route tentative because of the explosive ability that Davis possesses.  He should have attempted to jam Davis upon his release and force him outside or funnel him inside, depending on the safety help he was expecting to get over the top.

If either one of these instances were to occur, I believe Davis would not have adjusted to break his route deeper, but in fact, he would have broke his route underneath:

LB forces outside release

LB forces inside release

2) However, Davis’ ability to attack the defender’s leverage with speed (run directly at him) and freeze him – preventing him from making any lateral movement in an effort to jam – is just one of the reasons he is such a threat, anywhere on the field. This advantage in ability allowed Davis to get on top of the linebacker in coverage and effectively create the big play opportunity for the 49ers offense. David Woodley, the linebacker in coverage, also made a mistake when he immediately opened his hips, letting Davis run uncontested, right by him and over the top.

3) I would say that Davis took his “best available release” and that Woodley’s inability to get any sort of contact – to get him out of his route stem – allowed Davis to take the over the top opportunity. If Woodley would have done a better job of re-routing and staying on Davis’ hip, then Davis’ only move would have been to sink his hips, throw the defender by, and break flat underneath.

4) Once Smith recognized that it was man to man coverage (reading the strong side/inside linebacker turn and run with Davis) he initially wanted to throw to Crabtree on the shallow crossing route. Since Crabtree did a poor job in getting any kind of separation from his defender, Smith looked to his second option, Davis, on the “basic cross” (west coast offense term for the deeper crossing route).

5) Smith takes a 5-step drop, pumps once and recoils, as he reads Davis’ adjustment to take the route deep. Unable to step up in the pocket, due to push up the middle by the Steelers’ “Nose/Tackle” (N’T) stunt, he stands tall and lofts a beautiful touch pass to Davis, over the top of the linebacker and in front of the safety.

Smith and Davis took advantage of the Steelers’ mistake – they attempted to cover Davis with an inside linebacker 1 on 1 – and made a momentum shifting play on their way to scoring the first of two touchdowns by the offense on the night.

Because of Davis’ relevance in the 49ers passing game again, I would expect to see the Seahawks attempt to “bracket” him with double coverage this weekend, and force Smith and the 49ers passing game to look to other options.

In turn, this should also have an ancillary effect – by committing safeties to defend against Davis – and open up the numbers in the box for increased production in the running game. Look for the 49ers to return to a “ground and pound” game plan this weekend against the Seattle Seahawks.

I’d like to take a closer look at an element of the 49ers passing attack that I feel will help them contend with the blitzing scheme of the Pittsburgh Steelers on Monday Night Football – the shallow cross.

The 49ers have run several versions of this play, getting the ball to Vernon Davis and Delanie Walker in different situations.  I would look for more underneath crossing routes by all 49ers WR’s tonight.  They seemed to have some success with them early against Arizona (and Giants also), but went away from them late.  They are good against the blitz and the WR’s can settle vs zones and run away against man-to-man.

Let’s look at the following diagram as an example:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On this particular pass play against the Cardinals, the offensive line protected and Smith got the ball out to a crossing Vernon Davis.  There was a void in the Cardinals zone blitz scheme and Davis turned it into a 32-yard gain to put them inside the 10 yard line, setting up a go ahead score (field goal) late in the first half.

Here is the NFL video of the play:

QB-Smith-to-TE-Davis-32-yd-pass

A few coaching points to note on this play:

1) The offensive line protected the gut blitz by sliding 4 men to the right; they effectively passed off the inside gap stunts and linebacker exchange by keeping their shoulders square and getting depth off of the line of scrimmage.  RB Kendall Hunter stepped up to take the inside linebacker who initially came from depth and was able to slide underneath Smith’s drop to mirror the linebackers path.  The line ended up collecting Hunter’s assignment in their slide, so he committed to helping secure the pocket for Smith.

2) Smith takes a 5-step drop and reads the weak-side outside linebacker’s drop as he gets depth with Walker.  Smith delivers a pass on-time to Davis on the shallow cross as he hits a void in the underneath zone and has room to run after the catch.

3) The play has a high value in it’s versatility against both zone and man coverages.  If it were man to man, Walker would break his route off flat across the field and Davis would essentially look to “rub” his defender into Walker or his trailing defender to create separation.

4) The post/wheel combination with Tedd Ginn and Kyle Williams outside effectively clears out 3 defenders on the play as well.  The strong safety makes the mistake of not looking back to find the crossing Davis.  If he had done this Davis would have had to make a more distinct effort to “settle” in the zone rather than to keep running.  Likewise, Smith would have been forced to make a more precise throw to Davis’ back shoulder, away from the would-be flat defender.  But, for some reason the Cards all-pro safety decided to keep his eyes outside and sink to provide underneath help for the deeper route combination.  Smith and Davis took advantage of this and turned what should have been a routine 8-10 yard pass play into a 32 yard catch and run.

Look for more of this tonight as the 49ers attempt to counter the Steelers’ blitzing strategies.  The shallow cross is another staple of the west coast offense and provides Smith and the 49ers offense with the opportunity to get the ball out quickly to their play-makers with room to run after the catch.  It also allows for picks and rubs against man coverage and can be a viable way to get WR’s Crabtree, Ginn and Williams more involved as they employ different versions of the same play.